essential determinants of behavior, and power to mainpulate those determinants. Repeated efforts to control behavior will be successful to the extent that the crucial behavior-determining factors have been correctly identified, and in proportion to the technical feasibility of manipulating those factors in the desired direction. This implies that the long-run reliability of control is a joint (multiplicative) function of knowledge and power: knowledge without power cannot yield control, and power without knowledge can yield control only by accident.
Since there are wide variations among would-be conflict managers in their degree of success, it must be assumed that good luck, knowledge, and power are unevenly distributed, and that those who are repeatedly more successful than others have a larger share of knowledge and power relevant to the behaviors they try to control. In the world of common sense and nonscientific social thought, it is widely held that practical personal experience and favored social position tend to produce higher levels of relevant knowledge and power, and therefore greater success at behavior control and conflict management. In the world of social science, it is widely held that empirically tested formal theories of behavior produce more reliable and communicable knowledge than does personal experience. Those who adopt this position assume that systematic application of such theories will (at least in the long run) yield the most reliably successful conflict management approaches.
This does not imply that all behavior theories are equally useful, since they vary widely in empirical adequacy, generality, and other attributes. Nevertheless, any theory which purports to explain or predict behavior has definite implications for behavior control, since it points to the factors which determine behavior and which therefore would have to be manipulated if one wished to control behavior (assuming the truth of the theory). Different theories have different implications because they conceptualize behavior differently or because they point to different determining factors, or both. Presumably, the .theory of model with the greatest empirical validity and the greatest generality will lead to the greatest success in behavior [839] control and conflict management. However, it may not be possible to tell which theory has the greatest empirical validity unless it is actually tested through specific control efforts. This suggests that an examination of their behavior-control and conflict-management implications may be useful even before empirical research has produced a definitive choice among competing theories and models of behavior.
The following discussion is restricted to an analysis of the conflict management strategies implied by expected-utility models such as that proposed by Markus and Tanter in this issue's present symposium. Among contemporary theoretical approaches to the analysis of social conflict, perhaps the most widely used are those subsumed under the heading of decision theory, including both statisitcal decision theory (game theory, utility theory, and the like) and allied nonmathematical theories of decision-making. A key concept in the whole panorama of decision theory is the notion of expected utility, defined as the product of the utility of an event times its probability of occurrence. This concept (and its variants such as expected value and subjective expected utility) has been used in many fields for a long time (Miller, 1971) both in normative models of decision-making and in descriptive models which are intended to predict how people will actually behave, usually on the assumption that persons act so as to maximize expected utility. Without delving into the enormous technical literature in this field, the present paper will briefly demonstrate the range and complexity of the alternative strategies of behavior control implied by such models and will point out some of the difficulties and limitations that are likely to be encountered in any attempt to apply them in concrete conflict situations.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPECTED UTILITY MODELS
Expected utility (EU) usually refers to a (subjective) utility of an event weighted by its objective probability of occurrence, while subjective expected utility (SEU) merely substitutes a subjective (perceived) probability of occurrence in the same formula. The subjective expected utility of an outcome is thus defined as where p(o) is the perceived (subjective) probability that the given outcome will occur and Uo is the (subjective) utility of that outcome to the perceiver. Since p(o) can range from 0 to 1, the range of possible values for SEUo is the same as that for uo, which usually is assumed to vary from some negative value through zero to some positive value, dependeing on the scale one uses for measuring utilities. The above formula can be used in comparing preferences among possible outcomes, but, strictly speaking, it cannot be applied to actions unless one first considers the possible instrumentality of the action in bringing about the outcome. This can be done by defining the subjective expected utility of an action as where p(ola) is the subjective conditional probability that the outcome will follow if the action occurs. In the simplest case, the subjective expected utility of an action is an attitude-like construct, representing the product of a cognitive orientation, p(ola), and an evaluative orientation, uo, toward a possible outcome of that action.
Most formulas for SEUa are actually more complex than this, since they assume that any given action may lead to more than one outcome simulataneously. This leads to the postulation of several distinct utility terms, each with its own probability weight, and these component expected utilities are then summed to arrive at a total SEU. Thus, [841] where n is the number of separate outcomes which may simultaneously follow from the action. Although it is not necessary, some models further partition the outcomes into those with net positive utilities (benefits) and net negative utilities (costs), so that SEU becomes the algebraic sum of subjective expected benefits (SEB) (Simmel, 1955; Dahrendorf, 1959 (Russett, 1963; Fink, 1965; Dowty, 1972) Cognitive support for belief in the ineffectiveness of nonviolent methods is often quite strong. For example, the notorious lack of equality in the administration of justice for the poor and for minority groups becomes widespread knowledge in a variety of ways, and leads to a general discrediting of law enforcement and jurisprudence among the chronically defeated. Widespread dissemination of statistical evidence for such patterns of discrimination can strengthen the perception of the opponents' intransigence and lead to reduced confidence in institutionalized nonviolent methods of struggle (Tumin, 1968) . More generally, the members of a society develop stable expectations about the likelihood of a satisfactory settlement if they employ particular nonviolent methods or institutionalized mechanisms of conflict resolution. These expectations, based on accumulated experience and common knowledge, will usually be different for different parties and between different societies. Thus it is clearly possible for certain nonviolent modes of conflict resolution to be seen as ineffective in one group or society but quite effective in another (Nader and Metzer, 1963 
